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Simulating bounded rationality: 
Optimality modelling without 
an optimality commitment
Jason Noble
University of SouthamptonOutline of the argument
Evolved agents are boundedly rational.
Do tools like game theory and optimization methods for 
agent-based models imply a rationality assumption?  Can 
we still use them?
Yes we can: such tools are about identifying which of a set 
of behavioural alternatives is best in a given context.
They're effective ways of making contact between the two 
blades of the scissors: agent and environment.Unofficial summary (why I'm really here)
Student of fields such as agent-based modelling, 
behavioural ecology, artificial life, evolutionary psychology 
and evolutionary robotics.
Bounded rationality sits easily: never indoctrinated into 
traditions like mathematical logic or economics where 
unbounded rationality holds sway.
Concerned about link between bounded rationality and 
cognitive science as totally historical and contingent.
This threatens to invalidate some of the tools for modelling 
and theorizing that I find most useful.The myth of the rational maximizer
The rational agent as something close to a Laplacean 
demon.
Familiar story: unlimited computational resources for 
considering and calculating over alternatives.
A cluster of related (and equally implausible) ideas:
Fully rational agents, however produced, are 
maximizers.
Evolution can produce fully rational maximizing agents.
Evolution produces agents that can be treated as if they 
were rational maximizers.Some tools for modelling behaviour
Rational choice theory: what is the best policy given a utility 
function and some alternatives?
Game theory: what is the best policy given a utility function, 
some alternatives, and the assumption that one's opponent 
is also rationally maximizing their utility over alternatives?
Agent-based simulation models: extensions of the above 
into arbitrarily complex environments and sets of strategic 
options.  Optimization through learning, evolution, or both.
Are these tools fatally wedded to the notion of the agent as 
rational maximizer?Bounded rationality
The official version via Herbert Simon: it's impossible for 
real agents to be rational maximizers as the required 
resources are not available.
The same conclusions can be reached from quite different 
routes.
Valentino Braitenberg's Vehicles:  a neuroscientist's 
fable about how simple mechanisms can produce 
apparently complex behaviour.  
Evolutionary robotics: getting meaningful robot 
behaviour from random starting points plus a selection 
process.Braitenberg vehicles: a reminder that purposeful behaviour may 
well be the product of an accumulated bag of tricksWhere does this leave cognitive science?
If we throw out the myth of the rational maximizer, must the 
tools go too?
Contingency and history are important, but is cognitive 
science reduced to ethnography?
If the tools are viewed as doing local search in behaviour-
space, and not as part of a global rationality commitment, 
we are OK.Why was the rational-maximizer view so popular anyway? 
Like the clockwork metaphor and later the computer 
metaphor for the mind, a new tool was mistakenly applied 
across too broad a range of phenomena.
Externalism / internalism: the language of environmental 
influence pitched against the language of 
constraints.  Agreeing that natural cognizers will only be 
boundedly rational doesn't entail a jump all the way over to 
an internalist and historical perspective.
See also Godfrey-Smith's Complexity and the Function of 
Mind in NatureParadoxically, the limitations of the methods save them 
from being tied to a global rationality perspective.  Maynard 
Smith noted in Evolution and the Theory of Games  that 
game theory can easily respect genetic and other 
constraints because the set of available strategies must be 
explicitly specified.
What sort of explanation are we looking for?  An account of 
the causal interplay between organism and environment: 
both blades of the scissors.
Best illustrated with examplesThe Norway ratAn example: social learning in rats
Rats learn socially about food: neophobic but will eat novel 
food that others are eating.
Mechanism discovered by Galef: social learning through 
smelling the breath of other rats.
Weak point in the strategy: they still learn to like the food 
even if the other rat is sick.  And they can tell the difference 
between sick and healthy rats.Learning about food by smelling each other's breathIn parallel with the Kahneman and Tversky approach in 
humans, we could say: "Look at the silly animals, see the 
dumb mistake they're making!"
Instead our approach was to ask how would the 
environment have to be structured to make sense of this 
apparently crazy behaviour.
The alternative strategies we considered were not the whole 
universe of possible strategies (indeed, how could we 
specify this?) but general foraging and learning strategies 
that we knew other mammals exhibited. The results of a simulated evolutionary processWhat did we learn about rats?
Rat behaviour makes sense given an assumption of 
reasonably high sensitivity to toxic food.
Not established as true through the simulation, but a 
productive and reasonable way of generating hypotheses.
Both blades of the scissors are in play: Galef's work on the 
mechanisms behind social learning in rats fixes one blade, 
and we asked what environmental factors would make 
sense of the other.The putty-nosed monkeyAnother example: intentional 
communication in monkeys
Work in progress: a model of alarm calling behaviour in 
putty-nosed monkeys.
Their near relatives, vervet monkeys, are famous for their 
apparently referential signalling.  
Putty-nosed monkeys have recently been observed to have 
something like a primitive syntax in their calls.
Interesting animals for anyone concerned about continuity 
between animal communication and human language.  These guys have much to be worried about...Monkey alarm calls
Canopy dwelling monkeys that are preyed upon by leopards 
and eagles.
Use a system of alarm calls to warn each other of danger.
A range of systems can underlie the behaviour of signallers 
and receivers:
From hard-wired responses…
To complex cognition such as concepts, beliefs, and 
perspective-taking Currently involved in building a model to look at what level 
of cognitive sophistication we should expect from the 
monkeys given the environmental challenge they face.
Levels of intentionality (from Dennett) 
Zero-order system: signaller can't be said to believe 
anything; he is hard-wired to signal as soon as he sees a 
leopard
First-order system: signaller believes that there is a 
leopard nearby and decides to signal (difficult to 
distinguish from the zero-order case) 
Second-order system: signaller believes the receiver is 
not aware of the leopard 
Third-order system: signaller believes that the receiver 
will believe that the signaller has seen a leopardConclusions
Optimality modelling can be safely employed as long as it 
doesn't come with a commitment to global rationality.
These types of models are a useful way of getting both 
blades of the scissors in contact when thinking about 
bounded rationality.Acknowledgements
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